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1 Introduction
In this paper we study the e¢ ciency gains of strengthening Collective Action
Clauses (CACs) whereby a qualied majority of bondholders can bind all
bondholders (within the same issuance) to the nancial terms of a sovereign
debt restructuring 1 . By removing the threat of an individual creditor holdout,
strengthening CACs away from unanimity, should reduce the cost associated
with protracted sovereign debt restructuring driven by creditor coordination
failure (Liu, 2002).
Initially, CACs came to prominence in the aftermath of the Mexican crisis in
1995, but it was only after the successful issuance of $1 million global bonds by
Mexico in New York in March 2003 containing CACs that triggered a major
change in the market practice. Subsequently, the inclusion of CACs, especially
the qualied majority restructuring clauses, in the sovereign bonds issued in
New York has become more common (Kletzer, 2004a).
In this paper we study the e¢ ciency gains of strengthening Collective Action
Clauses (CACs) in a model with both creditor coordination under incomplete
information and sovereign debtor moral hazard. The starting point of our
analysis is a situation where, due to a negative shock, the sovereign debtor is
unable to fulll the terms of the debt contract thus triggering default. Con-
ditional on default, the sovereign debtor issues a new one-period bond rolling
over the outstanding coupon payment and the future obligations. As this con-
stitutes a change in the nancial terms of the existing debt contract, existing
creditors have to decide whether or not to accept the debt rollover under the
conditions of incomplete information about the future value of the new one-
period debt. We show that there are multiple Bayesian equilibria of the result-
ing creditor coordination game. We also show that an interim e¢ cient CAC
exists in threshold strategies and strengthening CACs away from unanimity
could result in welfare gains by improving creditor coordination (although
bondholder committees may be required to complement the role of CACs).
Next, we introduce debtor moral hazard by making the probability of default
conditional on the adverse shock a function of the actions (policy measures)
chosen by the sovereign debtor. When ex ante e¢ ciency requires the sovereign
debtor to choose actions that lower the probability of default, a positive crisis
1 CACs consist of two main provisions: majority restructuring provisions (hereafter,
qualied majority restructuring clauses) and majority enforcement provisions. While
the former allow the qualied majority of bondholders to bind all bondholders within
the same issuance to the nancial terms of a debt restructuring, the latter enable
the qualied majority of bondholders to limit the ability of minority of bondholders
to accelerate their claims after a default (IMF, 2002, p.14) In this paper, we focus
on the former aspect of CACs.
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risk conditional on default is a necessary condition for resolving debtors ex
ante incentives. We argue that di¤erent solutions to the creditor coordination
problem at the interim stage could alter the ex ante incentives of the sovereign
debtor. Since improved creditor coordination lowers crisis risk conditional on
default, such a measure increases the probability of default by relaxing the
incentives of the sovereign debtor to undertake the ex ante e¢ cient action.
In such cases, the interim e¢ cient CAC threshold is higher than the ex ante
e¢ cient CAC threshold. Therefore, in general, there is a conict between ex
ante and interim e¢ ciency.
Our analysis captures, in a simple model, two main concerns which have been
frequently raised in the policy debate over the reform of the international -
nancial architecture: whether strengthening CACs actually helps reduce the
cost of protracted debt restructuring and whether strengthening CACs would
induce the problem of debtor moral hazard (Kletzer, 2004a). Our key contri-
bution to this literature is to show that when both issues of sovereign debtor
moral hazard and creditor coordination under incomplete information matter,
the resulting conict between ex ante and interim e¢ ciency limits the welfare
impact of strengthening CACs.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses
related literature. In Section 3, we then present the basic model, which is used
to study creditor coordination and interim e¢ ciency in Section 4. In Section
5, we extend the model in Section 3 to allow for sovereign debtor moral hazard
and contrast the issue of interim e¢ ciency with the issue of ex ante e¢ ciency.
Section 6 concludes and contains a discussion of some policy issues.
2 Related literature
A number of existing papers model how strengthening CACs might reduce the
costs of debt restructuring and a¤ect sovereign debtor incentives. In general,
they nd that incorporating CACs into debt renegotiation raises welfare; how-
ever, these papers do not attempt to study the conict between ex ante and
interim welfare. In a bargaining model, Kletzer (2003) has shown that CACs
lead to welfare gains in post-default scenarios. Kletzer (2004b), building on the
analysis of Kletzer andWright (2000) (see also Bulow and Rogo¤, 1989) studies
a model of debtor-creditor bargaining where strengthening CACs eliminates
the ine¢ ciency of creditor holdout. In Kletzer and Wright (2000), a higher
probability of disagreement has a higher impact on the debtors willingness
to pay. In a very di¤erent setting from the one studied by us, Weinschel-
baum and Wynne (2005) show that CACs are useful in coordinating creditors
within the same jurisdiction thus this mechanism could lower the cost of debt
restructuring although they nd that CACs could have an adverse impact on
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the sovereign debtors incentive to run reckless scal policies that increase the
possibility of crisis. However, they do not carry out an explicit welfare analysis
(and certainly do not distinguish between ex ante and interim welfare) as we
do here. Pitchford and Wright (2007) argue that CACs enhance welfare in
the post-default scenarios. They argue that the net impact on welfare is still
positive even after taking into account debtor moral hazard; in contrast, here,
we show that strengthening CACs can unambiguously lower ex ante e¢ ciency.
There is also a literature which focuses on studying the impact of CACs on the
interest rate premiums after taking into account the ease of debt restructur-
ing and the problem of debtor moral hazard that result from CACs. Kletzer
(2004a) notes a potential drawback with strengthening CACs: interest rate
premiums may actually rise with the inclusion of CACs in sovereign bond
contract if creditors expect debtor moral hazard to dominate the benets of
easier, less costly restructuring. The empirical studies in this area provide a
mixed results for the impact of CACs on interest rate premium. Eichengreen
et al. (2003) include both primary and secondary market premiums in their
study and also nd that the credit rating of the issuer plays a crucial role.
They predict that CACs will be able to price ex ante debtor moral hazard by
lowering the borrowing cost for a creditworthy issuer but increasing the bor-
rowing cost for less creditworthy issuer. Eichengreen and Mody (2000, 2004)
study the launch spreads on emerging market bonds both bonds subject to
UK governing law and those subject to New York law and nd that CACs
reduce the borrowing cost for more creditworthy issuers, while the less cred-
itworthy issuers need to pay higher spreads for issuing bonds that contain
CACs.
On the contrary, Becker et al. (2003) and Richards and Gugiatti (2003) nd
that, by considering the yields in the secondary markets, the inclusion of
CACs in a bond issue did not increase the interest rate premium (and not
change the bond prices) for that particular bond. Their results seem to support
the ambiguous impact of CACs on cost of borrowing and bond prices. Our
model predicts that strengthening CACs will reduce borrowing costs for issuer
with high credit rating only when it lowers interim crisis risk. Weinschelbaum
and Wynne (2005) challenge the conclusions from previous empirical results
and argue that the results obtained by the previous empirical studies do not
account for (endogenous) IMF intervention and compositional e¤ects in the
markets for sovereign debt. They argue that CACs could be irrelevant in the
sovereign debt markets and therefore yield spreads with and without CACs
are uninformative about moral hazard problems.
While in Gai et al. (2004), Roubini and Setser (2004) and Tanaka (2006)
the crisis is exogenous to the mechanism of debt restructuring, in our model,
the crisis cost is endogenous through the threat of having an endogenously
generated crisis risk. Our analysis complements Tirole (2003) who provides a
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rationale for debt nance, short maturities and foreign currency denomination
of liabilities by adopting a dual- and common agencyperspective. His formal
analysis takes as exogenous both the probability of default conditional on the
adverse shock and the probability of debt crisis. In contrast, here while the
maturity structure of debt is taken as given, both the probability of default
and the probability of a debt crisis, conditional on default, are endogenous.
We also want to make a note that our analysis of the e¢ cacy of various policy
interventions is related to Rodrik (1998) who suggests that, when nancing
development by issuing bonds exposes the country to excessive crises, the
unrestricted use of such debt instruments should be limited.
Finally, in contrast to the unique equilibrium obtained in the literature on
global games which study coordination games with asymmetric information
(Carlsson and van Damme, 1993; Morris and Shin, 1998), here, conditional
on default, we obtain multiple Bayesian equilibria. In our paper, the way
payo¤s to creditors are indexed by the underlying fundamentals ensures that
an extreme form of coordination failure between creditors always exists for all
values of the fundamentals. In the global games literature, the way payo¤s
to creditors are indexed by the underlying fundamentals ensures that there
are always two extreme regions in the space of fundamentals with a strongly
dominant action 2 .
3 The Basic Model
There are three time periods, t = 0; 1; 2. We consider a sovereign debtor who
is embarking on a bond-nanced project t = 0 by issuing two-period bonds,
each with a face value of b, denominated in US dollars. These bonds are sold
to n identical private creditors. The promised return for each private creditor
is r at t = 1 and (1 + r) at t = 2. For future reference, note that all payo¤s
are denoted in t = 1 units.
We assume that the sovereign debtors capacity to service existing debt in pe-
riod t is determined by the amount of available international reserves denoted
by Qt for t = 1; 2. We also assume that, if there is no adverse, exogenous
shock or if there is a successful debt rollover at t = 1 conditional on default,
the debtor would obtain a non-contractible payo¤ Z > 0 3 at t = 2. The fact
2 There are, of course, other technical di¤erences. We look at a model with a nite
number of creditors. In our model, the (privately observed) signalling has a nite
support.
3 Following Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), we interpret this non-contractible payo¤
as the benet at t = 1 of gain in national output at t = 2 when a debt crisis
is prevented at t = 1. Another example of such non-contractible payo¤ can be
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creditors lend
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bond and
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whether or not to
agree to the debt
rollover
Fig. 1. Time line of events
that Z is non-contractible means that Z cannot be attached by the private
creditors in the settlement of their claims nor can the sovereign debtor make
a credible commitment to transfer such payo¤ to the private creditors.
So long as Q1 is greater than nrb at t = 1 and Q2 is greater than (1 + r)nb
at t = 2, all is well and the project will run to completion.
Consider what happens if an unanticipated, negative exogenous shock (bad
luck) occurs at t = 1. The adverse shock referred to here is a sudden de-
valuation of domestic currency, which triggers a substantial decline in the
international reserves Q1 and Q2 at both t = 1 and t = 2: the e¤ect of the
negative shock is persistent. Conditional on the negative shock, Q1 < nrb. The
sovereign debtors failure to comply with the terms of the debt contract con-
stitutes a technical defaultat t = 1. The precise way in which Q2 is a¤ected
is specied below.
Following a technical default, each creditor is entitled to accelerate her claim,
demanding the capital sum as well as the current coupon owed in the rst
period. In other words, a technical default makes the sovereign debt callable
at t = 1. Figure 1 shows the time line of events.
Conditional on default, the sovereign debtor issues a new one-period bond
rolling over the outstanding interest and capital owed in the existing two-
period bond. The new one-period bond has a face value of rb and promises a
return of (1 + r). Therefore, a successful debt rollover implies that, at t = 2,
the amount falling due becomes rb (1 + r)+(1 + r) b = (1 + r)2 b which at t =
described as follows. Suppose the funds borrowed by the sovereign debtor are used
to nance a publicly operated infrastructure project. If the infrastructure project
succeeds, the government enjoys the prospect of higher tax revenue as more domestic
and foreign rms invest and employment is generated. No private creditor can attach
the future tax revenues generated by the infrastructure project.
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1 (using 1
(1+r)
as the discount factor) is worth (1 + r) b. We nd it convenient
to work with normalized per capita creditor payo¤s, which are obtained by
dividing the gross creditor payo¤s by (1 + r)nb. Thus, in a normalized per
capita payo¤ term, the amount owed by the debtor to each creditor at t = 2
is 1.
Conditional on default at t = 1,  determines the value of the new one-period
bond issued by the debtor if the project continues to completion at period
t = 2 (in other words, if a su¢ ciently large number of private creditors roll
over), where  2 [0; 1]. It is important to note that  (1 + r)2 b is the amount
actually paid out by the debtor at t = 2, which, at t = 1, this amount is worth
 (1 + r) b (again using 1
(1+r)
as the discount factor). The (prior) probability
over  is given by some continuous probability density function p(:) (with P (:)
being the associated cumulative probability distribution).
Conditional on default at t = 1, there is an incomplete information: each
private creditor i receives a privately observed signal i 2 f   ";  + "g of
the true value of , where " > 0 but small. Specically, " < ", " > 0 and
" < 1
H
for large but nite H > 2. Conditional on , for each i, i is i.i.d. over
f   ";  + "g according to the distribution
n
1
2
; 1
2
o
4 .
We label an individual private creditor by i, where i = 1; :::; n. Each private
creditor privately observes a signal . Conditional on , each private creditor
simultaneously chooses an action ai () 2 fAccept (A), Reject (R)g, where A
denotes accepting the debt rollover (the new one-period bond issued by the
sovereign debtor, conditional on default at t = 1) and R denotes rejecting the
debt rollover. A strategy of the creditor i is a map that species an action for
each . Conditional on  = (1; :::; n), let a () = (a1 (1) ; :::; an (n)). For
each , let ~na () = # fi : ai () = Rg denote the number of private creditors
who choose to reject the debt rollover when the value of the signal is . Given
, let na () = ~na (   ") + ~na ( + ") denote the number of creditors who
reject the debt rollover.
How are the decisions of individual creditors aggregated? Built into the ex-
isting two-period bond contract is a critical threshold m 2 [0; 1], though in
practice, we look at the case in which m 2
h
1
n
; 1
i
, where m denotes the pro-
portion of private creditors that are needed to block a successful debt rollover
at t = 1, i.e. m represents the critical CAC threshold. Whenm = 1
n
, a decision
of only one private creditor not to roll over the short-term debts is su¢ cient
to prevent a successful debt rollover, which is equivalent to requiring unanim-
ity in the debt rollover decision. If the proportion of private creditors who
4 When  = 0, i = " for all i and when  = 1, i = 1   " for all i. Appropriate
adjustments to all expressions involving signals need to be made at the boundary:
these are not explicitly stated in the text.
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reject the debt rollover exceeds the critical CAC threshold, m, a sovereign
debt crisisoccurs 5 . In general, increasing m is equivalent to strengthening
CACs, which should make debt restructuring easier. Moreover, since all pri-
vate creditors are ex ante symmetric, by invoking the doctrine of pari passu,
we assume that any o¤er made by the sovereign debtor, conditional on default,
treats each creditor symmetrically.
Conditional on , in order to determine each creditor is payo¤s, there are two
scenarios to be considered.
In the rst scenario, na ()  mn. This scenario captures a situation where
there is no debt rollover. In this contingency, we assume that creditors enter
into the asset grab race as follows. Each private creditor who chooses to reject
the debt rollover is a rst mover in the asset grab race, while the private
creditor who chooses to accept the debt rollover is a second mover. The payo¤
of each creditor i depends on whether she is the rst- or the second mover in the
asset grab race. The rst mover recovers either her initial investment, b, plus
interest, rb, or the liquidation value of foreign-owned assets by the sovereign
at t = 1, denoted by q, minus the privately borne legal costs, L, leaving the
second mover with the residual resources. In other words, litigation allows the
rst mover to exit without much loss of value but it is potentially costly for
the second mover. Formally, the payo¤ to the rst mover is determined by
the function g such that g(na) = min
n
1; q
na(1+r)b
o
  L
(1+r)b
, where na < n,
g(n) = q
n(1+r)b
  L
(1+r)b
. Note that the normalization is done by dividing the
creditors payo¤s by (1+r)b. For internal consistency, we assume that q
n
 L > 0
and that q
n
  L < (1 + r) b (otherwise, the sovereign debtor could liquidate
its own foreign-owned assets and service its debt) so that 0 < g(n) < 1. The
payo¤ to the second mover is determined by the function l (n  na) such that
l (n  na) = max
n
[q (1+r)bna]
(n na)(1+r)b ; 0
o
, where na < n and again the normalized
payo¤ is obtained by dividing the creditors payo¤ by (1 + r)b. Note that the
function l(n na) is well-dened for all na as long as we have that (1 + r) bn >
q. Thus, the payo¤s to private creditor i when na ()  mn can be specied as
follows. If ai () = R, the per capita normalized payo¤ for creditor i is g (na),
while if ai () = A, the per capita normalized payo¤ to creditor i is l(n  na).
In the second scenario, na () < mn. In this scenario, the debt rollover is
successful. If ai () = R, the per capita payo¤ for creditor i is  (1 + r) b L0,
5 It is important to note the distinction between a technical default and a sovereign
debt crisis. A technical default occurs when the sovereign debtor is unable to pay the
promised returns to the private creditors in the rst period due to the occurrence of
an adverse, unanticipated shock. Conditional on default, debt rollover game takes
place and each creditor decides whether to accept the debt rollover (the new one-
period bond issued by the sovereign debtor at t = 1). A sovereign debt crisis only
occurs when a su¢ ciently large number of creditors decide not to roll over the debts.
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while if ai () = A, the per capita payo¤ to creditor i is  (1 + r) b, where
L0 > 0 reects the fact that an individual creditor, who unsuccessfully tries
to accelerate the project, pays a small legal fee, L0, for doing so but as the
debt rollover is successful, obtains her continuation payo¤  (1 + r) b. After
normalizing the payo¤s by dividing the creditor is payo¤s by (1 + r)b, we
obtain the following: if ai () = R, the per capita normalized payo¤for creditor
i is  ', while if ai () = A, the per capita normalized payo¤ to creditor i is
, where '  L0
(1+r)b
.
We study the Bayesian equilibria of this game.
In most policy discussions, and in our model, the private creditors have to
decide whether or not to accept the debt rollover conditional on default but
before all payo¤-relevant uncertainty has been fully revealed. Accordingly,
we ask whether relative to a rst-best benchmark, which corresponds to the
case with complete information about the value of the new one-period bond
issued by the debtor, the equilibrium crisis risk is interim e¢ cient 6 . As all
creditors are identical, it follows that whenever the per capita payo¤ from
debt rollover exceeds the per capita payo¤ when all the creditors are the rst
movers, it requires that there should be a successful debt rollover, i.e. whenever
  g (n), where n is the total number of private creditors, the project should
be continued to completion at t = 2, while if  < g (n), the project should
terminate at t = 1. As throughout the paper we base our analysis on a xed
n, it follows that g(n) is just a constant.
4 Creditor Coordination and CACs: Interim Welfare
In this section, we examine the conditions under which the Bayesian equilibria
of the creditor coordination game is interim e¢ cient. We study two strategic
scenarios: a situation in which the actions of creditors do not depend on their
privately observed signals and a scenario in which the creditorsactions depend
on their signals and each creditor uses a threshold strategy.
6 From an ex ante viewpoint, the relevant welfare comparison would have to take
into account both states of the world where the debt is rolled over and states of
the world where the debt is not rolled over. In this section and the following, unless
explicitly stated otherwise, we assume that, in the rst-best ex ante scenario, the
project will be funded.
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4.1 Creditor Coordination and Interim E¢ ciency when Creditors Actions
do not Depend on Signals
In this subsection, we examine the interim e¢ ciency of the Bayesian equilibria
when the actions of creditors do not depend on their signals. We begin by
noting the extreme forms of coordination failure: conditional on default, it is
always an equilibrium for all creditors to choose not to roll over irrespective
of their signals. As long as m  n 1
n
, if n  1 creditors reject the debt rollover,
then the remaining creditor will also reject the debt rollover. Evidently, in
such a scenario, strengthening CACs (equivalently, increasing m) will have
no e¤ect on the debt rollover. Note that such scenario is an equilibrium even
when  is close to 1:
At the other extreme, when m > 1
n
, there is also always an equilibrium where
the debt is rolled over with a probability one. Indeed, if all other creditors agree
to a debt rollover (i.e. accept the new one-period bond issued by the sovereign
debtor after a technical default occurs at t = 1), a deviation by an individual
creditor cannot block the debt rollover. Note that such an equilibrium persists
even when  is close to 0.
It follows that for each  2 [0; 1] and privately observed signal , as long
as 1
n
< m < n 1
n
, both action proles, one where each creditor agrees to a
debt rollover and the other where each creditor rejects the debt rollover, are
both Bayesian equilibria. Clearly, such Bayesian equilibria cannot be interim
e¢ cient.
What is the impact of strengthening CACs? Consider a situation in which
the debt rollover is interim e¢ cient. Suppose that the existing two-period
debt contract has m = 1
n
. Within this class of Bayesian equilibrium, there
is no possibility of a debt rollover. What happen if m increases so that we
strengthen CACs away from unanimity. By doing so, the preceding analysis
suggests that there will be a new equilibrium where the debt rollover occurs
with a probability one. However, note that even when it is e¢ cient to do so,
there is no guarantee that strengthening CACs alone will ensure that creditors
coordinate on the new equilibrium.
4.2 Creditor Coordination and Interim E¢ ciency with Threshold Strategies
In what follows, we show that there are other equilibria where all private cred-
itors use symmetric threshold strategies so that for some  2 [0; 1], whenever
i  , creditor i rolls over but whenever i < , creditor i does not rollover.
Let us denote such strategy conguration by a. For such equilibria, creditor
coordination depends on the payo¤ relevant uncertainty.
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Given a, conditional on , let EmR denote creditor is expected payo¤ from not
agreeing to the debt rollover and EmA denote creditor is expected payo¤ from
agreeing to the debt rollover. To compute EmR and E
m
A , it is necessary for us to
compute the probability that other creditors not agreeing to the debt rollover.
Given the strategies of other creditors, conditional on observing a signal ,
from the perspective of any one creditor, in general, the number of other
creditors not agreeing to the debt rollover is a random variable. For any private
creditor i, givenm, if all other private creditor k 6= i are following a symmetric
threshold strategies, a, and creditor i observes a signal  = , let pj () denote
the probability that exactly j other creditors (from a population of n   1
other private creditors) do not agree to the debt rollover 7 . Given a threshold
strategy , notice that fpj ()gn 1j=0 is a symmetric binomial distribution. For
the two di¤erent threshold strategies  and 0, it is checked that the two
distributions, fpj ()gn 1j=0 and
n
pj

y
on 1
j=0
, are identical, where
pj () = pj

y

=
 
n  1
j
!
1
2
n
= pj.
The expected payo¤ of creditor i from not rolling over the debts, EmR , is given
by
EmR =
n 1X
j=mn 1
g(j)pj + (   ')
n(m)X
j=0
pj; (1)
where n(m) = max f0;mn  2g. 8
The rst term in equation (1) can be interpreted as follows. Given that (mn 1)
private creditors have chosen to reject the debt rollover (which occurs with a
probability
n 1X
j=mn 1
pj), if creditor i chooses to reject the debt rollover, this is
su¢ cient to render the debt rollover at t = 1 to be unsuccessful thus the asset
grab race ensues. When this is the case, since the creditor is action is rejecting
the debt rollover, the creditor i and each of the other (mn   1) creditors are
entitled to receive g(j), which is the payo¤ to the rst mover in the asset grab
race. The second term in equation (1) shows the expected payo¤ of creditor i
under the case in which n(m) other private creditors already decided to reject
the debt rollover. Despite the fact that creditor i chooses to reject the debt
rollover, this is not su¢ cient to block a debt rollover. Therefore, each of the
n(m) creditors as well as the creditor i receives the continuation value, , net
of a small legal fee, ', for unsuccessfully trying to accelerate the project.
The expected payo¤ of creditor i from agreeing to the debt rollover, EmA , is
7 Recall from Section 3 that p(:) is the continuous probability density function,
which gives the (prior) probability over .
8 In what follows, we assume, for ease of exposition, that mn is an integer.
11
given by
EmA =
n 1X
j=mn
l(n  j)pj + 
mn 1X
j=0
pj: (2)
The rst term in equation (2) shows creditor is expected payo¤ when there
are already mn private creditors chosen to reject the debt rollover; thus, even
though creditor i chooses to accept the debt rollover, the debt rollover is
unsuccessful and the asset grab race occurs. Since creditor i chooses to accept
the debt rollover and did not join the queue in the asset grab race, she is
classied as the second mover and is entitled to receive l(n   j). The second
term in equation (2) captures the expected payo¤ to creditor i under the
scenario in which the debt rollover is successful. Each of the (mn  1) private
creditors and creditor i receives the continuation payo¤, .
The following proposition establishes that a Bayesian equilibrium in symmetric
threshold strategies exist and is decreasing in the CAC threshold, m.
Proposition 1 The Bayesian equilibrium threshold, m, exists. Whenever
0 < m < 1, 

m is an interior Bayesian equilibrium threshold. Moreover,
m is decreasing in the critical CAC threshold, m; thus, strengthening CACs
should make debt restructuring easier.
PROOF. We begin by proving the existence of an interior Bayesian equi-
librium threshold. When creditor i is choosing a best response, (a) whenever
EmR  EmA > 0, creditor i does not agree to the debt rollover, and (b) whenever
EmR  EmA  0, creditor i agrees to the debt rollover. Conditional on observing
the signal  = , creditor is expected payo¤s from not agreeing to the debt
rollover, EmR , and her expected payo¤s from agreeing to the debt rollover, E
m
A ,
are given by the expressions in (1) and (2), respectively. Notice that both EmR
and EmA are increasing linear functions of , the intercept of E
m
A is lower than
the intercept of EmR , and the slope of E
m
A is higher than the slope of E
m
R . As
l(n  j) is strictly less than g(j) for all j; l(n  j) is decreasing in j, and g(j)
is increasing in j, by computation, we have
EmR   EmA =
n 1X
j=mn 1
g(j)pj + (   ')
n(m)X
j=0
pj  
n 1X
j=mn
l(n  j)pj   
mn 1X
j=0
pj
=
n 1X
j=mn
[g(j)  l(n  j)] pj + [g(mn  1)  ] p(mn 1)   '
n(m)X
j=0
pj:
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Fig. 2. An interior Bayesian equilibrium threshold
It follows that there exists a 
0
m such that E
m
R   EmA = 0, where

0
m = g (mn  1) +
n 1X
j=mn
[g(j)  l(n  j)] pj   '
n(m)X
j=0
pj
p(mn 1)
;
where p(mn 1) =

n 1
mn 1
 
1
2
n
. Therefore, a Bayesian equilibrium threshold,
m, exists, where 

m = min
n

0
m; 1
o
and it is interior whenever m < 1.
When an interior Bayesian equilibrium threshold, m, exists, what is the im-
pact of an increase in m on m? As m increases, the events where there is
a successful debt rollover have a higher probability. By rst-order stochastic
dominance, for m;m0 where m < m0, by computation note that Em
0
R (

m)  
Em
0
A (

m) < 0, this implies that 

m0 < 

m. Therefore, 

m is decreasing in m.
Q.E.D.
It is useful to depict the interior Bayesian equilibrium threshold in Figure 2.
Proposition 1 implies that, in general, when an interior Bayesian equilibrium
threshold, m, exists, strengthening CACs away from unanimity lowers 

m,
thus improving coordination among private creditors and reducing the interim
crisis risk, conditional on default.
From the perspective which we adopt here, we ask whether strengthening
CACs allows us to achieve an interim e¢ ciency. In what follows, we charac-
terize the interim e¢ cient CAC threshold. It follows that when the creditors
use threshold strategies, at the Bayesian equilibrium threshold, m, the ex-
pected payo¤to the creditor is m. By computation, observe that whenm = 1,
m = 0 < g(n); however, when m = 0, 

m = 1 > g(n). As 

m is decreasing
in m, by correcting for the integer e¤ects, it follows that there exists a CAC
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threshold, m^, such that m^ = g(n). We refer to this CAC threshold, m^, as an
interim e¢ cient CAC threshold 9 .
In general, our analysis says that strengthening CACs away from unanimity
is a move towards an interim e¢ ciency when the creditors use the threshold
strategies. However, even ifm = m^ nothing in our analysis so far suggests that
creditors will coordinate on the Bayesian equilibrium with interim e¢ cient
threshold strategies.
4.3 CACs and the role of the bondholder committee
Our analysis in both the preceding subsections indicates that the choice of
m, for example by strengthening CACs away from unanimity, will have an
impact on the set of Bayesian equilibria of the creditor coordination game.
However, because in this setting there are multiple Bayesian equilibria, merely
manipulating m will not guarantee that creditors coordinate on the interim
e¢ cient equilibrium. This creates a role for the third parties like the creditor
coordination committees or bondholder committee to ensure that the creditors
coordinate on the interim e¢ cient Bayesian equilibrium.
How would the bondholder committee help? Eichengreen and Portes (2000)
and Portes (2000) highlight the potential relevance of the bondholder com-
mittee. Mauro and Yafeh (2003) analyze the role played by the Corporation
of Foreign Bondholders (CFB), which is an association of British investors
holding bonds issued by foreign governments. The CFB provides information,
which includes the economic commentary, data as well as the analysis of po-
litical developments in the debtors country, to bondholders, especially in the
case of default. The provision of information by the CFB helps facilitate the
coordination among the creditors as the creditors tend to agree on a common
strategy if they base their decisions on similar data and analysis (Mauro and
Yafeh, 2003, p.13). Besides providing information, the CFB also helps coor-
dinate bondholdersactions: whenever possible, attempts were made to foster
unanimity among bondholders. Even though an individual bondholder is not
formally barred from taking independent action, the benets from cooperation
are usually so great that there can seldom be su¢ cient ground for a separate
action.
9 By using a theoretical model of grey-zone nancial crisis, which allows for the
interaction of liquidity problems with solvency problems, Haldane et al. (2004) nd
that the sovereign debtorsoptimal choice of CAC threshold could vary because of
their di¤erent risk preferences and creditworthiness. In our analysis, the optimal
CAC threshold, m^ , ensures that probability of crisis risk, conditional on default, is
interim e¢ cient.
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5 Debtor Moral Hazard: Interim Vs Ex Ante E¢ ciency
In this section, we study ex ante debtor moral hazard. There are two main rea-
sons for doing so. First, it enables us to endogenize the probability of default
conditional on the adverse shock. Second, we want to rule out the possibility
of long-term debt contracts, which mature at t = 2. In principle, the presence
of long-term debt contracts maturing at t = 2 could be welfare improving
since this type of contract would rule out the interim ine¢ cient creditor coor-
dination. With ex ante debtor moral hazard, a positive crisis risk, conditional
on default, is a necessary condition for resolving debtors ex ante incentives.
Therefore, long-term debt contracts should not be used with ex ante debtor
moral hazard 10 .
We assume as before that the sovereign debtor issues two-period bond at t = 0,
which promises an interest coupon at t = 1 and repayment of the capital sum
together with the second interest coupon at t = 2. At t = 0, the sovereign
debtor has to choose an ex ante action, a0, which is a level of e¤ort, where
a0 2 fG;Bg. Note that G and B denote good and bad ex ante e¤ort put in
by the debtor, respectively. In this context, good e¤ort can be interpreted as
the e¤ort which makes the sovereign debtor less vulnerable to the negative
external shock, while the bad e¤ort corresponds to the e¤ort which makes
the sovereign debtor more vulnerable to adverse external shock 11 . We assume
that ca0 2
n
cG; cB
o
denote the cost of e¤ort, measured in t = 1 payo¤ units.
We also assume that it is more costly for the debtor to exert good e¤ort than
to choose bad e¤ort so cG > cB. Let pa0 denote the ex ante probability of
default conditional on the adverse shock when the ex ante action a0 2 fG;Bg
10 In the current policy debate over how to improve the crisis resolution frame-
work, there has been a growing recognition that the proposals to solve creditor
coordination problems need to take into account their impact on sovereign debtors
incentives. Ghosal and Miller (2003) argue that a convincing treatment of sovereign
debt crises and their resolution needs to combine creditor coordination and debtor
incentives in a consistent framework. Their main argument is as follows: selecting
equilibrium without taking account of debtors behavior is inappropriate if di¤er-
ent solutions to the creditor coordination problem alter incentives of the sovereign
debtor,(Ghosal and Miller, 2003, p.284). As pointed out by Barro (1998) (as cited
in Ghosal and Miller, 2003), if the probability of project termination were reduced
to zero, the sovereign debtor could have an incentive to use the borrowed money
unwisely. This, thus, implies that a positive probability of project termination may
be necessary to solve the debtor moral hazard problem.
11 In this context, good e¤ort could correspond to a situation where money is bor-
rowed and used to promote R&D in the export sector and bad e¤ort could corre-
spond to transferring borrowed money to local elites who are then free to put it in
tax havens overseas. See Ghosal and Miller (2003) for more examples on ex ante
debtor moral hazard and for other relevant results.
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is chosen by the sovereign debtor. We assume that the probability of default
conditional on the adverse shock is higher if the debtor chooses bad e¤ort so
pB > pG.
The source of ex ante debtor moral hazard in our model is the misalignment
between the incentives of private creditors and the incentives of sovereign
debtor. As in Section 3, we assume that, if there is no adverse shock at t = 1
or if there is a successful debt rollover at t = 1 thus the project continues to
completion in the second period, the debtor obtains a non-contractible payo¤
Z > 0 at t = 2. We also assume that, conditional on default, creditors have to
decide whether or not to roll over the debt before observing the ex ante choice
of action by the debtor 12 .
As a function of the equilibrium threshold prevailing in the post-default debt
rollover game, m, let (

m) denote the debtors expected payo¤conditional on
default, measured in t = 1 payo¤ units. The expression for (m) is a product
of two terms: the rst term is the ex ante probability of a successful debt
rollover at t = 1 and the second term is the non-contractible payo¤ obtained
by the sovereign debtor at t = 2 if the project continues to completion at
t = 2. Let us denote the ex ante probability of a successful debt rollover at
t = 1 by Pr (m). It follows that the debtors expected payo¤ conditional on
default, measured in t = 1 payo¤ units, (m), is given by
(m) = Pr (

m)Z: (3)
By the rst-order stochastic dominance, a higher Bayesian equilibrium thresh-
old, m, implies a lower ex ante probability of successful debt rollover at t = 1,
Pr (m); thus, (

m) is decreasing in 

m. The implication is that the debtors
expected payo¤ conditional on default, measured in t = 1 payo¤ units, (m),
is decreasing in the Bayesian equilibrium threshold prevailing in the post-
default debt rollover game, m.
The debtors payo¤ from choosing a good e¤ort is given by the expression
(1   pG)Z + pG(m)   cG, while the debtors payo¤ from choosing a bad
e¤ort is given by the expression (1   pB)Z + pB(m)   cB. The incentive
compatibility constraint, which ensures that the sovereign debtor chooses good
e¤ort, is determined by the following expression
(1  pG)Z + pG(m)  cG  (1  pB)Z + pB(m)  cB: (4)
By substituting equation (3) into (4) and rearranging, we obtain an upper
12 For instance, it takes time for the debtors action to be revealed and creditors
have to decide whether or not to agree to the debt rollover before the action of the
debtor is revealed.
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bound on the ex ante probability of successful debt rollover at t = 1, Pr (m),
given by
Pr (m)  1 
(cG   cB)
Z(pB   pG) : (5)
Since 0  Pr (m)  1, cB > cG and pB > pG, a necessary condition for (5) to
be satised is that 1  (cG cB)
Z(pB pG)  0. This condition can be rewritten as
Z(pB   pG)  cG   cB: (6)
The LHS of (6) captures the ex ante incremental gain, from the sovereign
debtors perspective, from choosing a good e¤ort (since the probability of
default conditional on the adverse shock is higher if the debtor chooses bad
e¤ort), while the RHS of (6) represents the ex ante incremental loss for the
debtor from choosing a good e¤ort (since it is more costly for the debtor to
exert good e¤ort than to choose bad e¤ort).
It is, however, important to note that this computation is done under an
assumption that, in the event of a crisis, the debt rollover occurs with a prob-
ability zero.
Before proceeding further we need to clarify the conditions under which it is
ex ante optimal for the debtor to choose G. Clearly, if pB  pG, it is possible
that this is not so. The following result states the su¢ cient conditions under
which it is ex ante optimal for the debtor to choose G.
Lemma 2 There exists " where " is small number close to zero such that if
pB  1   " and pG  " and Z > cG, then ex ante e¢ ciency requires that the
sovereign debtor chooses a good e¤ort.
PROOF. Consider a scenario where pB  1   " and pG  " . Let K be the
maximum ex ante expected payo¤ to a creditor conditional on default over
the set of Bayesian equilibria and over m. By denition, whenever  < 1,
and there is a successful debt rollover, the payo¤ to a creditor is less than
one. When there is no successful debt rollover, even if the creditor has a rst
mover advantage, she has to pay a positive legal cost. Therefore, K < (1+r)b.
Next, consider the limit case, when " = 0. In this case, the ex ante per capita
creditor payo¤when G is chosen is higher than the ex ante per capita creditor
payo¤ when B is chosen i.e.

1  pG

(1 + r) b > pBK. Irrespective of which
Bayesian equilibrium prevails in the creditor coordination game conditional
on default, for all values of m, by continuity of the payo¤s in pB; pG, there is
an "0 close enough to zero, if pB  1  "0 and pG  "0, the ex ante per capita
creditor payo¤ when G is chosen continues to be greater than the ex ante per
capita creditor payo¤when B is chosen. Next, by a symmetric argument, note
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that if Z > cG, the ex ante payo¤ of the sovereign debtor with action G also
exceeds the ex ante payo¤ of the sovereign debtor with action B if pB  1 "00
and pG  "00, for some "00 close enough to zero. Let " = min f"0; "00g. Then, if
pB  1  " and pG  " and Z > cG, then ex ante e¢ ciency requires that the
sovereign debtor chooses a good e¤ort. Q.E.D.
In the remainder of the section, we assume that it is ex ante e¢ cient for the
sovereign debtor to choose G.
It follows that in order to achieve an ex ante e¢ ciency, the probability of a
successful debt rollover conditional on default cannot be too high. However, as
interim e¢ ciency requires the probability of a successful debt rollover condi-
tional on default to be a xed number, Pr (m^), improved creditor coordination
may lead the sovereign debtor to choose the ex ante ine¢ cient action: there
is, in general, a conict between interim and ex ante e¢ ciency.
Let ~m denote the ex ante optimal CAC threshold, i.e. a level of CAC threshold
which ensures that condition (5) is satised as an equality. A consequence of
the preceding analysis is that m^ 6= ~m. If Pr (m^) > 1   (c
G cB)
Z(pB pG) , so that
the debtor will never choose to put in a good e¤ort if she anticipates that the
interim e¢ cient threshold will prevail conditional on default, we must have
Pr (m^) > Pr (

~m) and therefore, 

m^ > 

~m which implies that ~m < m^.
Moreover, it is possible that the only ex ante e¢ cient CAC threshold is una-
nimity. Restricting m to be an integer, it follows that there are parameter
congurations for which (5) is satised if m = 1
n
but not when m  2
n
.
We summarize the above discussion with the following proposition:
Proposition 3 When ex ante e¢ ciency requires the sovereign debtor to choose
G, the interim e¢ cient CAC threshold will be higher than the ex ante e¢ cient
CAC threshold and the resulting conict between interim and ex ante e¢ ciency
limits the welfare impact of strengthening CACs.
6 Conclusion
This paper is devoted to study the following concern which has been frequently
raised in the policy debate over the reform of international nancial architec-
ture: how to reduce the cost of protracted sovereign debt restructuring when
emerging market countries are in sovereign debt crisis. Given that the use of
CACs has been encouraged as the approach for restructuring the unsustain-
able debts, some very important concerns arise. What is the impact of CACs
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on welfare? Would improving coordination among creditors relaxes the incen-
tives of the sovereign debtor to avoid default? In this paper, we address such
concerns by studying the conict between ex ante and interim e¢ ciency when
both issues of sovereign debtor moral hazard and creditor coordination under
incomplete information are present. We argue that in such cases the welfare
impact of strengthening CACs is limited.
Even at the interim stage, as there are multiple Bayesian equilibria, we have
argued that there is a role for third parties like the creditor coordination
committees or bondholder committee to ensure that the creditors coordinate
on the interim e¢ cient Bayesian equilibrium.
Since one limitation of CACs is that it cannot address ex ante issues, this
raises the question of whether there is a role for an appropriately designed
formal sovereign bankruptcy procedure that addresses both ex ante and ex post
issues. The key element of such procedure relies on the ability of the court in
making the debtors non-contractible payo¤ becomes contractible ex ante 13 .
With this element being embedded to it, such appropriately designed sovereign
bankruptcy procedure is useful in solving the problem of ex ante debtor moral
hazard and leading to more orderly sovereign debt restructuring. In fact, this
view has also been shared by several authors, including Sachs (1995), Buchheit
and Gulati (2002) and Krueger (2001, 2002). Of course, such a procedure must
ensure that payments made in the resolution phase can be made conditional
on the policy e¤ort undertaken by the sovereign debtor.
Extending the model to a dynamic setting to study the interaction between
sovereign debt crisis and endogenous growth is an important topic for future
research.
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